Exploiting Fractures: Eritrea’s Influence on Ethiopia’s War, Peace, and the Battle for Red Sea Access
How the Ethiopia–Eritrea rivalry continues to shape Tigray, national politics and the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa
Eritrea has increasingly become one of the most consequential external actors in Ethiopia’s political crisis. From the devastating Tigray war to the unresolved question of Red Sea access, the relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has repeatedly transformed Ethiopia’s internal political disputes into wider regional security crises. Yet describing Eritrea simply as “the main troublemaker” risks overlooking the domestic political divisions, armed conflicts and institutional weaknesses that have also driven Ethiopia’s instability. A more accurate assessment is that Eritrea has repeatedly exploited—and at times intensified—existing fractures within Ethiopian politics, while Ethiopia’s own political actors have sometimes created the conditions that allow Asmara’s influence to become decisive.
The current tension is therefore not merely a bilateral dispute. It is part of a much longer struggle involving sovereignty, borders, Tigrayan politics, Ethiopia’s federal system, access to the Red Sea and competing visions of political power in the Horn of Africa.
A relationship built on war and mistrust
The modern Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship was shaped by the Eritrean struggle for independence, Eritrea’s independence in 1993 and the devastating Ethiopia–Eritrea border war of 1998–2000.
The Algiers Agreement ended the war and established a framework for resolving the dispute. The subsequent international boundary process was supposed to provide a foundation for lasting peace. Instead, relations remained frozen for years, while both governments viewed the other as a strategic threat. The United Nations repeatedly warned during the post-war period about military tensions and violations of the security arrangements established after the conflict.
This history is essential to understanding Eritrea’s later involvement in Ethiopian politics. For the Eritrean leadership, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was not simply another Ethiopian political organization. The TPLF had been one of the dominant forces in Ethiopia’s political system for nearly three decades and had fought Eritrean forces during the liberation struggle and later governed Ethiopia during the period of the Ethiopia–Eritrea border conflict.
Consequently, the political confrontation between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the TPLF after 2018 was viewed in Asmara through the lens of an old strategic rivalry.
The 2018 peace agreement: reconciliation or temporary alignment?
When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, one of his most consequential foreign-policy decisions was to normalize relations with Eritrea.
The opening of the border and the dramatic reconciliation between Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki initially appeared to transform the Horn of Africa. Abiy received the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize partly for his efforts to resolve the conflict with Eritrea.
But the peace process produced an unusual political reality.
While Addis Ababa and Asmara were becoming closer, relations between the federal government and the TPLF were deteriorating. Tigray’s leadership increasingly viewed the federal government’s relationship with Eritrea with suspicion, particularly because of the historical hostility between the TPLF and the Eritrean government.
The result was a triangular political relationship:
Addis Ababa–Asmara cooperation → TPLF suspicion → worsening federal–Tigray relations.
What began as an international peace process consequently became intertwined with Ethiopia’s domestic political struggle.
That dynamic would become explosive.
Eritrea’s role in the Tigray war
The clearest evidence of Eritrea’s ability to influence Ethiopian politics came during the Tigray war, which began in November 2020.
Eritrean forces entered Tigray and fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces against forces affiliated with the TPLF. For months, the Ethiopian government denied the presence of Eritrean troops, before eventually acknowledging their involvement in March 2021. Eritrea also acknowledged its participation.
The involvement was not marginal.
The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia later stated that Eritrean forces had been present in Ethiopia since the beginning of the conflict and that their involvement significantly exacerbated the conflict’s scale and intensity. The commission documented allegations involving killings, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, attacks on refugee camps, indiscriminate shelling, destruction and looting.
Human Rights Watch separately documented serious abuses by Eritrean forces, including the killing of civilians in Axum. It reported that Eritrean soldiers killed hundreds of residents during a period of violence in November 2020.
These findings do not mean that Eritrea was responsible for all the atrocities committed during the war. Human rights investigations documented serious abuses by multiple parties, including Ethiopian federal forces, Eritrean forces, Tigrayan forces and Amhara forces.
Nevertheless, Eritrea’s direct military intervention fundamentally altered the conflict.
It converted what was initially an Ethiopian internal confrontation into an internationalized war involving two sovereign states.
Why Eritrea had an interest in defeating the TPLF
The strategic logic behind Eritrea’s intervention is relatively straightforward.
The Eritrean government had spent decades viewing the TPLF as a principal security threat. During the 1998–2000 war, the two sides fought directly. Even after the war ended, the relationship remained hostile.
The emergence of a federal government in Addis Ababa willing to cooperate with Asmara therefore created an opportunity for Eritrea to weaken an old adversary.
From Asmara’s perspective, eliminating the TPLF’s military dominance in Tigray could potentially achieve several objectives:
- reduce a historic security threat along Eritrea’s southern border;
- prevent the TPLF from regaining influence in Addis Ababa;
- strengthen Eritrea’s strategic relationship with the Ethiopian federal government;
- reshape the balance of power in northern Ethiopia;
- prevent Tigray from becoming a political or military challenge to Eritrea.
This helps explain why Eritrea’s participation in the Tigray war was strategically significant.
The Pretoria agreement did not solve the Eritrea problem
The November 2022 Pretoria Agreement ended the large-scale Ethiopia–Tigray war, but it did not completely resolve the geopolitical questions surrounding Eritrea.
The agreement called for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The International Crisis Group noted that Eritrean troops had fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces and that subsequent implementation discussions included commitments concerning their withdrawal.
However, international investigators continued to report the presence of Eritrean forces in parts of Tigray after the peace agreement.
The international commission established by the UN Human Rights Council reported that Eritrean forces remained present in Ethiopian territory and that their continued presence complicated the implementation of the peace process.
This created one of the most important unresolved questions after Pretoria:
Who controls Ethiopia’s northern security environment?
If foreign forces remain inside Ethiopia after a peace agreement, the country’s sovereignty and the credibility of the peace process become difficult to separate.
Eritrea and the fragmentation of Tigrayan politics
The post-war period has also exposed another dimension of the Eritrea question: political fragmentation inside Tigray.
The TPLF itself has experienced serious internal divisions. Competition between political figures and factions has complicated the implementation of the Pretoria agreement and the restoration of stable regional governance.
Recent analysis has described Tigray as experiencing a form of “negative peace,” in which large-scale war has stopped but underlying political and security disputes remain unresolved.
Eritrea is not responsible for every disagreement inside Tigray. These divisions have their own historical and political origins.
But Eritrea’s strategic position means that developments inside Tigray cannot easily be separated from its security calculations.
This is particularly important because Tigray shares a long border with Eritrea, while communities such as the Irob and Kunama have populations and historical connections extending across the international frontier.
Consequently, every political crisis in Tigray has the potential to become a security issue for Asmara—and every Eritrean security calculation has the potential to influence politics in northern Ethiopia.
The Red Sea question: the next major fault line
The most dangerous development in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations may now be the dispute over Red Sea access.
Ethiopia became landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Since then, Ethiopia has relied heavily on neighboring countries, particularly Djibouti, for maritime trade.
For Addis Ababa, access to the Red Sea is increasingly presented as a strategic and economic necessity.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly argued that Ethiopia’s geographic and economic relationship with the Red Sea makes maritime access a legitimate national interest. In February 2026, he told parliament that Ethiopia’s relationship with the Red Sea was inseparable and advocated negotiated, mutually beneficial arrangements with neighboring states.
For Eritrea, however, this issue is existential.
Eritrea possesses a strategically important coastline and the ports of Massawa and Assab. Any Ethiopian demand for territorial, military or long-term strategic access through Eritrea is therefore viewed through the lens of Eritrean sovereignty.
The dispute is particularly sensitive because Ethiopia has increasingly emphasized the economic and strategic consequences of remaining landlocked.
The result is a classic security dilemma:
Ethiopia sees maritime access as a national necessity; Eritrea can interpret Ethiopian maritime ambitions as a potential threat to its sovereignty.
If neither side manages this dilemma diplomatically, economic rhetoric can eventually become military strategy.
Eritrea’s influence is real—but Ethiopia’s internal politics matter more than outsiders sometimes admit
Calling Eritrea the “main troublemaker” in Ethiopian politics can be politically powerful, but analytically it is incomplete.
Ethiopia’s instability cannot be explained by Asmara alone.
The country faces deep disagreements over federalism, ethnicity, territorial administration, political representation, land, security structures and the distribution of political power. Armed conflicts have also persisted in several regions.
Chatham House noted in May 2026 that Ethiopia entered its national election period amid instability in Tigray and Amhara and strained relations with Eritrea and Sudan. It also argued that an election alone would not resolve the country’s deeper political and security problems.
This is crucial.
A foreign actor can exploit political divisions, but it cannot create every division from nothing.
Ethiopian political elites themselves have repeatedly used ethnic, regional and historical grievances to mobilize support. Political competition has frequently become securitized, while armed organizations have emerged or expanded when political negotiations failed.
Therefore, blaming Eritrea for all Ethiopian political problems can actually obscure the domestic reforms necessary to resolve them.
Eritrea’s political system also shapes its foreign policy
Another reason Eritrea has such a distinctive influence is the nature of its political system.
Human Rights Watch describes Eritrea as a highly repressive one-party state under President Isaias Afwerki, with no independent legislature, independent judiciary or independent civil society capable of providing meaningful institutional checks. It also reports widespread indefinite national service and severe restrictions on political and media freedoms.
This centralized system allows Eritrea to pursue foreign-policy objectives with unusual consistency.
There is little domestic political competition capable of forcing the government to publicly reconsider its strategic assumptions.
For Ethiopia, by contrast, political power is distributed among federal institutions, regional governments, political parties, security organizations and competing social constituencies.
That asymmetry matters.
Asmara can maintain a relatively coherent long-term security strategy, while Addis Ababa must constantly manage competing domestic political interests.
The danger of the “enemy state” narrative
There is also a danger in portraying Eritrea as an inherently hostile country.
The people of Eritrea are not the Eritrean government.
Millions of Eritreans have historical, cultural, linguistic and family connections with communities in Ethiopia. Eritrean refugees have themselves suffered during the conflicts involving both Eritrean and Ethiopian forces.
Human Rights Watch documented abuses against Eritrean refugees in Tigray by both Eritrean government forces and Tigrayan forces during the war.
Consequently, an Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation would not simply be a conflict between two governments.
It would affect interconnected communities across the border.
That is why political leaders on both sides have a responsibility to distinguish between legitimate national-security concerns and rhetoric that demonizes entire populations.
The larger Horn of Africa equation
Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be viewed in isolation from Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and the Gulf states.
The Horn of Africa is increasingly important because of its proximity to the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and major global shipping routes.
Ethiopia’s search for maritime access intersects with:
- Eritrea’s sovereignty and coastal security;
- Djibouti’s port economy;
- Somalia’s territorial concerns;
- Sudan’s civil war;
- Gulf-state competition;
- international shipping interests;
- military deployments around the Red Sea.
This means an Ethiopia–Eritrea crisis could quickly become a regional crisis.
The danger is particularly acute because Ethiopia is one of Africa’s largest countries by population and military capacity, while Eritrea occupies an exceptionally strategic location along the Red Sea.
Is Eritrea really the “main troublemaker”?
There is a strong case for describing Eritrea as one of the most important external drivers of Ethiopia’s northern political instability.
Its military intervention in the Tigray war was real and consequential. International investigators documented serious abuses by Eritrean forces and their continued presence in parts of Ethiopia after the Pretoria agreement.
Its strategic rivalry with the TPLF has also been a major factor in the politics of northern Ethiopia.
And the unresolved Red Sea dispute creates a new source of confrontation between Asmara and Addis Ababa.
But calling Eritrea the sole or even universally “main” cause of Ethiopian political instability would go too far.
The deeper problem is a regionalized domestic political crisis.
Ethiopian political divisions provide the openings. Eritrean strategic calculations exploit some of those openings. Tigrayan political competition adds another layer. Amhara–federal tensions create another. The conflicts in Oromia and elsewhere add further pressure. Sudan’s instability and Red Sea geopolitics then multiply the risks.
The real problem is therefore not simply Eritrea.
It is the interaction between Ethiopia’s unresolved internal political order and the strategic ambitions of neighboring states.
What Ethiopia needs to do
If Ethiopia wants to reduce Eritrea’s ability to influence its domestic politics, the solution cannot be limited to military deterrence.
Addis Ababa needs to reduce the political vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit.
That means:
First, consolidate the Pretoria peace process.
The remaining questions surrounding territorial administration, displaced populations, security arrangements and foreign forces need credible implementation.
Second, establish a durable Ethiopia–Eritrea diplomatic channel.
Even when relations are hostile, communication between military and political leaderships can prevent misunderstandings from becoming wars.
Third, separate Red Sea access from territorial revisionism.
Ethiopia has legitimate economic interests in maritime access, but sustainable access is more likely to emerge through negotiated commercial, logistical and security arrangements than through threats or maximalist historical claims.
Fourth, strengthen Ethiopia’s internal political settlement.
A government that enjoys broad legitimacy and has functioning institutions is harder for foreign powers to destabilize.
Fifth, pursue accountability for abuses by all sides.
The absence of accountability creates grievances that can be mobilized for another war.
Sixth, involve regional and African institutions.
The African Union, IGAD and other regional mechanisms should have a stronger role in preventing Ethiopia–Eritrea tensions from becoming another major Horn of Africa conflict.
Conclusion: Eritrea is a factor, not Ethiopia’s destiny
Eritrea occupies a unique position in Ethiopian politics.
It is simultaneously a neighbor, former part of the Ethiopian state, former adversary, military actor, Red Sea power and strategic rival. Few countries can influence Ethiopia’s security environment so directly.
The Tigray war demonstrated the consequences of this relationship. Eritrea’s military intervention dramatically changed the balance of forces and contributed to the internationalization of Ethiopia’s internal conflict. International investigators subsequently documented serious abuses and concerns over the continued presence of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia.
Today, however, the greatest danger may not be the legacy of the Tigray war alone.
It is the possibility that unresolved Ethiopian internal divisions will once again intersect with Eritrea’s security calculations and Ethiopia’s determination to secure Red Sea access.
If that happens, the Horn of Africa could enter another cycle of confrontation.
The strategic lesson for Ethiopia is therefore clear: the strongest defense against external political interference is not simply a stronger army; it is a stronger political system.
Ethiopia cannot choose its geography, and it cannot eliminate Eritrea as a neighboring state. But it can choose whether its internal political disagreements become opportunities for neighboring governments to exploit.
The future of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations will ultimately depend on whether both governments continue to treat their relationship as a zero-sum struggle—or recognize that permanent instability serves neither country’s long-term interests.
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